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The Move Toward Uniformity: The Statute of Limitations
for Rule 10b-5
INTRODUCTION
Rule 1Ob-5' is a federal antifraud provision relating to the purchase
and sale of securities. Although lOb-5, as written by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), was originally designed to eliminate a
loophole in the SEC's own enforcement powers, for more than four
decades federal courts have consistently held that it also gives rise to
an implied private cause of action. The issue of the appropriate statute
of limitations to be applied in private lOb-5 claims has been an abundant
source of confusion and dispute. Rule lOb-5 itself, not contemplating
private suits, is understandably silent on the subject. Before 1988, it
had at least seemed clear that the controlling periods in these limitations
controversies were to be determined by state law, and not by some
analogous federal provision. The federal courts had become "so accus-
tomed to turning to state periods of limitations that [they] did this on
auto-pilot." 2 However, beginning in 1988 with the seminal case of In
re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation,3 some of the federal courts
of appeal began applying a federal statute of limitations to lOb-5 claims. 4
Thus, there is currently a split among the federal circuits as to whether
to apply a state or federal statute of limitations to lOb-5 claims.
The significance of the decision whether to apply a federal or state
statute of limitations stems from the fact that the various state statutes
of limitations which have been applied to lOb-5 actions range from one
year in Maryland to ten years in Tennessee,5 while the federal statute
of limitations applied in Data Access was one year from discovery, but
not longer than three years from the violation.6 Thus, the resort to a
federal rather than state statute of limitations can serve to eliminate a
Copyright 1991, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990) [hereinafter 10b-5].
2. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, No. 90-526 (Sept. 26, 1990).
3. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
4. Currently, the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits apply a federal statute of
limitations while the remainder of the federal circuits apply a state statute of limitations.
5. Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on
Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus. Law 645, 648 (1986) [hereinafter
Report].
6. 843 F.2d at 1550.
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claim that would have been otherwise viable in some states, while in
other states it can resuscitate a claim that would have expired under
the otherwise applicable statute of limitations. Because of the uncertainty
as to the proper statute of limitations, the time has come for the question
to be definitively answered: what is the appropriate source of the statute
of limitations to be applied to lob-5 claims? The United States Supreme
Court has recognized this need, and has recently granted certiorari in
a lOb-5 statute of limitations case, Reitz v. Leasing Consultants As-
sociates.7
The purpose of this comment is to determine whether a state or
federal statute of limitations is the appropriate period to apply to 10b-
5 litigation. This comment will examine the statutory and jurisprudential
history of lOb-5, relevant federal statutes and United States Supreme
Court cases, and the writings of numerous securities commentators. This
comment suggests that a federal statute of limitations is the appropriate
period to be applied to litigation under lOb-5. However, because there
is currently no firm basis for the Courts of Appeals to apply such a
federal statute of limitations, the United States Supreme Court, in lieu
of legislative action, must announce a new standard which permits federal
courts to borrow the statute of limitations set forth in section 13 of
the 1933 Securities Act for application to lOb-5 claims.'
History and Development
Rule lOb-59 was written in 1942 by the SEC under the authority of
Congress granted by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.10 The text of lOb-5 does not provide for an express, private cause
7. 895 F.2d 1418 (table) (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 242 (1990).
8. This Act provides:
Limitations of Actions
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section
11 or section 12(2) unless brought within one year after the discovery of the
untrue statement or the omission, or after such discovery should have been
made by the exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a
liability created under section 12(1), unless brought within one year after the
violation upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action be brought
to enforce a liability created under section 11 or section 12(1) more than three
years after the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under section
12(2) more than three years after the sale.
15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). For the interesting story of how Rule lOb-5 was
formulated, see L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation at 726-27 (2d ed. 1988).
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
[Vol. 51
COMMENTS
of action, as it was originally intended to serve as a means for SEC
regulation of fraud with regard to securities.11 Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
However, beginning in 1946 with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.,12
courts have consistently recognized an implied private cause of action
inherent in lOb-5. Although "Congress cannot be faulted for not pro-
viding a statute of limitations, because the ... private cause of action
* . . is a genie sired solely by the judiciary," 3 the absence of a statute
of limitations expressly applicable to lOb-5 private causes of action has
been the source of a great deal of uncertainty.' 4
Prior to 1988, the issue of whether to apply a state or federal statute
of limitations to the implied, private cause of action under Rule lOb-
5 was well settled in the federal courts. The federal circuits unanimously
applied state statutes of limitations to Rule lOb-5 claims, adhering to
the principle, derived from the Rules of Decision Act, 5 that when federal
law is deficient, state law should be consulted in order to fill the gap. 6
The first issue raised by the resort to state law is which state's law
ought to apply. This matter was resolved by applying the law of the
11. L. Loss, supra note 9, at 727. "The Commission got what it wanted: a handle
for investigating and obtaining injunctive relief against insiders who are buying their
companies' stock. The writer can vouch that nobody at the Commission table gave any
indication that he was remotely thinking of civil liability."
12. 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
13. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537, 1547 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
14. L. Loss, supra note 9, at 997. With regard to statutes of limitations, of all the
implied civil liabilities in securities law, "Rule lOb-5 has been by far the most prolific
breeder of litigation."
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948).
16. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, No. 90-526 (Sept. 26, 1990). See also M'Cluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
270 (1830).
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forum state to the claim. 17 Although it became settled among the federal
jurisdictions that resort was to be made to the forum state's law for
the statute of limitations for lob-5, it was not clear which state statute
should be applied. The alternatives considered by courts have included
the statute of limitations for state blue sky laws 8 and common law
fraud. 9 In order to make the determination, the courts have utilized a
resemblance test, choosing the period of limitations for state actions
that most closely resembles the substantive elements of lob-5. 20 The
results of the resemblance test have been inconsistent, with some courts
applying one of the state's blue sky laws2' and others applying the state's
action based on fraud. 22
Formulation of a New Theory
The well settled rule among the federal courts prior to 1988 was
that the applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action arising
under lOb-5 was to be borrowed from state law. Criticism of the
borrowing rule has come not only from the courts, but also from scholars
and the bar.23
In Norris v. Wirtz,24 for example, the Seventh Circuit voiced its
displeasure with the borrowing of state periods. Judge Easterbrook,
writing for the majority, termed the absence of a uniform statute of
limitations under lOb-5 "one tottering parapet of a ramshackle edifice." '25
Judge Easterbrook opined that the courts ought to have been using an
analogy with other federally created causes of action which have three
year statutes of limitations:
Congress has not been silent about limitations for securities law
in general, the usual problem that leads federal courts to turn
to state law; it has been silent only with respect to rights of
action it did not create. Whenever it created a federal right to
17. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 211 n.29, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1389 n.29
(1976).
18. Suslick v. Rothschild Sec. Corp., 741 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1984); Kennedy v.
Tallant, 710 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1983); Landry v. All Am. Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381
(5th Cir. 1982).
19. Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 739 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir.
1984); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983).
20. Martin, Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions: Which State Statute is Appli-
cable?, 29 Bus. Law. 443, 454 (1974).
21. See cases cited supra note 16.
22. See cases cited supra note 17.
23. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir.), petition for
cert. filed, No. 90-526 (Sept, 26, 1990).
24. 818 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987).
25. Id. at 1332.
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sue, it also created a statute of repose no longer than three
years. That is what the courts should have used.26
In spite of this belief, the court ultimately held that "it is too late for
an inferior court to turn back the clock," '2 7 and therefore reluctantly
adhered to the doctrine of stare decisis by applying the borrowed state
period .21
In 1986, the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities issued
the "Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied
Actions. '"29 The committee found that the inconsistent federal court
decisions which necessarily result from the resort to state law for the
statute of limitations for lOb-5 have promoted forum shopping, have
reduced judicial efficiency, and have reduced predictability, all without
advancing any countervailing public policy.30 Thus, the committee con-
cluded that the borrowing doctrine should be abandoned in favor of a
rule requiring the application of a federal statute of limitations to federal
causes of action lacking express periods of limitation.3
In 1988, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, decided the time had
come to reconsider whether to apply a state or federal statute of lim-
itations to lOb-5 litigation. The court held that in light of several recent
pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court
"directed us to apply the most analogous federal statute of limitations
to certain federal causes of action," 32 it was no longer clear that the
lower courts were bound to borrow state law statutes of limitations.
Relying on Agency Holding v. Malley-Duff & Assoc.," the latest in a
trilogy of Supreme Court cases on the subject of borrowed limitations
periods,14 the Third Circuit formulated a new test for determining whether
to apply a state or federal statute of limitations to lOb-5 claims.
The Supreme Court had held in Malley-Duff that a federal statute
of limitations should be applied to a federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 3 claim. RICO, as is the case with
26. Id. at 1333 (emphasis added).
27. Id.
28. It should be noted that three years later the Seventh Circuit overruled Norris in
Short. The analysis used in Norris was helpful to the Short decision, as was the fact
that the Third Circuit had previously broken ranks.
29. 41 Bus. Law. 645 (1986).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537, 1540 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
33. 483 U.S. 143, 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987).
34. Agency Holding v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987);
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985); DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
35. RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
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lOb-5, creates a federal cause of action but does not contain an express
statute of limitations. In determining from which source to draw the
statute of limitations for RICO claims, the Court drew from a test it
had formulated in DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamster3 6
and followed in Wilson v. Garcia:37
when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a
closer analogy than available state statutes, and when the federal
policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make that
rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial law-
making, we have not hesitated to turn away from state law.3"
Thus, in order to apply a federal statute of limitations, two requirements
must be fulfilled: 1) the federal statute must provide a clearly closer
analogy, and 2) the policies and practicalities of litigation must favor
application of the federal statute.
In Malley-Duff, the Court determined that the Clayton Act was
more closely analogous to RICO than a state statute limiting fraud or
a state "catchall" statute of limitations based on the textual similarities
between the two federal acts, the legislative history of RICO which
revealed that RICO was patterned after the Clayton Act, and the fact
that there was no single state law which was comparable to RICO.3 9
Under the second element of the DelCostello test, the Court found
that the multistate nature of RICO made a federal statute of limitations
desirable. The application of state statutes of limitations to a cause of
action which necessarily involves multiple states would open the door
to undesirable forum shopping and would require complex and expensive
litigation.4 The application of a federal statute of limitations allows
courts to avoid issues such as conflicts of laws and which state statute
of limitations to apply.
Thus, the Malley-Duff court concluded that because "the Clayton
Act clearly provides a far closer analogy than any available state statute,
and ... the federal policies that lie behind RICO and the practicalities
of RICO litigation make the selection of the ... statute of limitations
for Clayton Act actions ... the most appropriate limitations period for
RICO actions," it is appropriate to borrow this federal statute of lim-
itations for application to a federal RICO claim .4
The Data Access court found that the trilogy of Supreme Court
cases, Malley-Duff, DelCostello, and Wilson v. Garcia, were sending a
36. 462 U.S. 151, 103 S. Ct. 2281 (1983).
37. 471 U.S. 261, 105 S. Ct. 1938 (1985).
38. 483 U.S. at 148, 107 S. Ct. at 2763.
39. Id. at 150-54, 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2764-66.
40. Id. at 154, 107 S. Ct. at 2766.
41. Id. at 156, 107 S. Ct. at 2767.
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"strong signal" that the Supreme Court favored uniform federal statutes
of limitations for federal causes of action. Judge Aldisert, writing for
the majority of the en banc panel in Data Access, stated that the
"Supreme Court opened the door to borrowing relevant federal limi-
tations statutes" 42 in cases such as DelCostello, Wilson, and Malley-
Duff. Therefore, the Data Access court felt compelled to "return to
the test decreed by the Supreme Court: borrow a state statute of lim-
itations period if you can, but 'when the federal policies at stake and
the practicalities of litigation make [a federal] rule a significantly more
appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking' ... borrow the federal
statute."
3
Applying this test to the facts of the Data Access case, the court
found that this was just the kind of case where a federal statute provides
a closer analogy than any available state statute." Because there are
other federal securities statutes which are aimed at the objectives of
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, and since they all compensate the same
type of injury, the court found that these federal securities statutes
clearly provide a closer analogy to lOb-5 than the state blue sky laws
or state common law fraud statutes. The state blue sky laws were not
found to be more closely analogous because of their widely varying
statutes of limitations as well as their disparate statutory coverage. 45
Similarly, the common law fraud statutes were found to be inapposite
because of their lack of uniformity." The court went on to hold that
from a policy and practicality standpoint, it is preferable to draw from
the Securities Act provisions that grant an express cause of action,
because the "reference to state law makes for a great amount of utterly
wasteful litigation. '47 Therefore, the Data Access court held that the
proper period of limitations for a lOb-5 claim is one year from the
plaintiff's discovery of the facts constituting the violation, but in no
case more than three years after the alleged violation. 4s
The Seventh Circuit has also applied a federal statute of limitations
to lOb-5 litigation. In Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Co.,49 the
court began by distinguishing federal securities statutes from other federal
statutes in an effort to demonstrate that the general rule that requires
borrowing of state limitations periods is not necessarily applicable to
42. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537, 1549 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
43. Id. at 1548.
44. Id. at 1550.
45. Id. at 1549.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1550.
48. Id.
49. 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-526 (Sept. 26, 1990).
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securities law. Federal securities law was distinguished on three grounds.
First was the fact that lOb-5 does not contain an express private cause
of action. Since the cause of action was judicially, rather than legis-
latively, created, 0 "[flederal courts have an obligation to create stable
periods of limitations." 5'
The second ground for distinguishing federal securities law is that
Congress did in fact provide an express period of limitations for each
securities cause of action which it expressly created. Congress intended
and desired, therefore, to have its federal securities remedies regulated
by a federal statute of limitations. 2
The third distinguishing factor was that the securities statutes require
transactions in interstate commerce, which necessarily implicates time
consuming conflict-of-laws analysis. If resort is to be made to state
statutes of limitations, the task becomes determining which state's lim-
itations period to use. 3
The court then observed that under the authority of DelCostello
and Malley-Duff, the federal courts of appeals were no longer necessarily
required to apply a state statute of limitations to lOb-5.5 4 Applying the
DelCostello two-prong test, 5  the court found that a federal statute,
section twelve of the 1933 Securities Act,5 6 was clearly more closely
analogous to lOb-5 than any available state statute. The court also found
that the statute of limitations applicable to section twelve, located in
section thirteen of the 1933 Securities Act,5 better served the policies
and practicalities of litigation under lob-5. These findings were based,
in part, on the court's analysis in Norris v. Wirtz,"s in which the court
found that section 13 of the 1933 Securities Act provided the most
appropriate statute of limitations for lOb-5, but refused to apply the
section 13 statute of limitations because at the time federal courts lacked
the authority to do soA9
50. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
51. 908 F.2d at 1387.
52. Id. at 1387-88.
53. Id. at 1388.
54. Id.
55. DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72, 103
S. Ct. 2281, 2294 (1983).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988). Not coincidentally, this is the same federal statute of
limitations applied by the Data Access court. The Short court was influenced by the fact
that selecting a federal statute of limitations other than section 13 of the Securities Act
of 1933 would result in a fresh conflict among the circuits. 908 F.2d 1385, 1390 (7th
Cir. 1990).
58. 818 F.2d 1329, 1332-33, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943, 108 S. Ct. 329 (1987).
59. Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir.), petition for




The Second Circuit became the third federal jurisdiction to apply
a federal statute of limitations to a 10b-5 claim in Ceres Partners v.
GEL Associates.6" In light of the fact that the Second Circuit has
jurisdiction wihin the state of New York, the securities center, this case
is of major significance. The Ceres court was persuaded by the logic
* of Data Access and Short. Judge Kearse, writing for the court, concluded
that "[g]iven Congress's enactment of national rules against securities
fraud in the belief that national law ought to govern such multi-state
transactions, the subjection of claims under those laws to a multiplicity
of state-law statutes of limitations is inconsistent with the congressional
purpose.' '61 Applying the DelCostello test, the court found that state
statutes are inappropriate and that the policies and practicalities of
litigation favor the application of a single statute of limitations.
62
CONTROVERSY AMONG THE, CMCUITS
Although the Third Circuit has consistently followed its decision in
Data Access63 and the Second and Seventh Circuits recently adopted the
same approach in Ceres and Short, respectively, the remainder of the
circuits have not yet had the opportunity or have declined to follow
the path toward a uniform federal statute of limitations for lOb-5 claims.
The Tenth Circuit, in Bath v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines and Jonas,
64
for example, recently reversed a federal district court's application of
the Data Access holding. The District Court had used the Data Access
reasoning to find that the plaintiff's cause of action under lOb-5 was
time-barred. 65 However, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[w]hile
we recognize the simplicity of having a single limitations period for all
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims, the rule in this circuit is that such
suits are subject to the appropriate limitations statute of the state in
which the alleged violation occurred,"' ' stating that "we are unaware
of any circuit court cases electing to follow Data Access. ' ' 67
60. 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
61. Id. at 359.
62. Id.
63. Gatto v. Meridian Medical Assoc., Inc., 882 F.2d 840 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1136 (1990); Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 542 (1989); Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 691 (3d
Cir. 1988).
64. 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990).
65. Id. at 818-19.
66. Id.
67. Id. Although the court was unaware, the Seventh Circuit in Short had previously
elected to follow Data Access. Short was decided on July 30, 1990 while Bath was not
decided until August 30, 1990.
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Both the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have similarly declined to take
the Data Access approach. In Nesbit v. McNeil"a and Smith v. Duff
and Phelps, Inc. ,69 the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, held
that they were bound to follow their own prior panel decisions which
used state limitations periods. The Ninth Circuit signaled its apparent
willingness to adhere to its prior holdings by rejecting a request for an
en banc review of its prior decisions which applied state statutes of
limitations.7 0
The strikingly perverse result of the currently existing split among
the circuits is to drastically reduce the intended benefits of Data Access
and its progeny. The Data Access, Short, and Ceres holdings can be
circumvented by a plaintiff when his lob-5 claim involves a party or
transaction not connected with the Second, Third, or Seventh Circuits.
A plaintiff with a claim that is stale under the 1933 Act and which
might be properly brought in the Second, Third, or Seventh Circuit can
easily bring the claim elsewhere because of the venue provisions of the
Exchange Act itself. Under those provisions, an action may be brought
in any jurisdiction in which the defendant resides, is located, or conducts
business. Therefore, until the application of a federal statute of limi-
tations to lob-5 claims becomes the rule in a substantial number of
circuits, Data Access, Short, and Ceres only serve to increase forum
shopping, uncertainty, and litigation, because plaintiffs will have still
another option with regard to the statute of limitations for lOb-5.
Analysis
One way or another, the split which currently exists among the
federal circuits regarding the source upon which to draw for the ap-
propriate statute of limitations for lOb-5 must be resolved. As the
situation currently stands, several of the circuits apply the statute of
limitations for a state blue sky statute, 7' others use the limitations period
applicable to a common law fraud action,72 while still others apply the
statute of limitations prescribed in section 13 of the 1933 Securities
Act. 73 At the same time, the Securities and Exchange Commission has
68. 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990).
69. 891 F.2d 1567 (lth Cir. 1990).
70. 896 F.2d at 384.
71. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assoc., 918 F.2d 349, 354 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing cases
applying these statutes of limitations).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Ceres Partners v. GEL Assoc., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990); Short v.
Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, No. 90-526
(Sept. 26, 1990); In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849, 109 S. Ct. 131 (1988).
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advocated the use of the statute of limitations set forth in section 20A
of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 74
Arguments For and Against Uniform Federal Statute of Limitation
The borrowing of state statutes of limitations for lOb-5 litigation
has been the source of a great deal of scholarly criticism. "With a
unanimity unmatched in any other corner of securities law, everyone
wants a simpler way-and to everyone that means a uniform federal
statute of limitations. ' 7 Professor Thomas Hazen has stated that the
"weight of scholarly authority favors the application of a federal lim-
itations period in order to promote uniformity. ' 76 Professor Loss posed
the following question in his examination of the lob-5 statute of lim-
itations issue: "with the 1933 and 1934 Acts so closely related [to lob-
5], why not look to their statutes of limitations by way of analogy
rather than to a variant state law?" ' 7  Professor Loss concluded that it
would be "eminently more consistent with the overall statutory scheme
to look to what Congress itself did when it was thinking specifically of
private actions in securities cases rather than to a grab-bag of more or
less analogous" state provisions. 78
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of adopting a uniform
federal statute of limitations is that doing so would be logically consistent
with the overall federal scheme of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Reading the
two in pari materia, as they were intended to be read, 79 it is clear that
the legislative intent was to require that all actions based on fraud
arising under the Securities Acts be brought within one year from
discovery of the violation and with an outside limit of three years from
the violation or date of sale. 0 This legislative intent is frustrated by
the application of state statutes of limitations to 10b-5 claims because
the available state periods range from one to ten years.81
Professor Bloomenthal has noted that "[ilt is self-evident that Con-
gress in adopting the Exchange Act did not intend that private remedies
should depend upon the forum in which a private action is initiated,
74. Ceres Partners, 918 F.2d at 352.
75. Short, 908 F.2d at 1389.
76. T. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation, § 13.8, at 127-28 (2d
ed. 1990).
77. L. Loss, supra note 9, at 995.
78. Id.
79. Martin, supra note 20, at 454.
80. H. Bloomenthal, Securities Law Handbook § 25.02(7), at 797 (1989-90 ed.). Note
that section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b), is an exception, as it has a maximum period of
two rather than three years, but this section applies only to insider trading.
81. Report, supra note 5, at 645.
19911
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
but opted for a national uniform system of regulation."2 The application
of state statutes of limitations to lOb-5 claims clearly precludes this
legislative decision from being carried out.
Not only did Congress desire a uniform system implicating a uniform
rule for limitation of actions, it also specifically intended to apply a
limitations period that is relatively short. The Securities Act of 193383
gave the purchaser two years from the date of discovery of the fraud,
but in no case more than ten years after the sale, in which to bring
the claim. When Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 193485
it added or amended provisions to allow suit to be brought no later
than one year after discovery, and in no case more than three years
after the transaction in question.16 The application of state periods,
which in many cases are longer than the period adopted by Congress
for express securities causes of action, 7 defeats Congress' attempt to
minimize not only the possibility of false claims, but also the adverse
effects of lingering liability.
Application of state statutes of limitations to lOb-5 claims results
in another undesirable effect: wasteful litigation.8 Because every juris-
diction has at least two statutes which conceivably could be applied to
lob-5 claims (the state blue sky law or common law fraud statutes),
every 1Ob-5 claim will necessarily involve a determination as to which
state statute of limitations is applicable. 89 Additionally, because every
10b-5 claim necessarily involves interstate transactions, courts must apply
conflict-of-laws principles in order to determine which state's statute
should be used. The borrowing of state periods can lead to absurd
results, as evidenced by a hypothetical situation posed by the court in
Ceres:
if two suits are brought in different states seeking damages for
a single act in violation of the federal securities laws, one suit
may be barred while the other is not. Indeed, in a single such
suit brought in a state whose law requires borrowing of the
laws of an out-of-state plaintiff, the claims of some plaintiffs
may be time-barred while those of other plaintiffs are notY°
82. H. Bloomenthal, supra note 80, at 796 (emphasis added).
83. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1988).
84. Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943, 108
S. Ct. 329 (1987).
85. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1988).
86. 818 F.2d at 1332.
87. Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, and Vermont all have applicable statutes of limitations which are longer
than three years. 41 Bus. Law. 645, appendix B.
88. L. Loss, supra note 9, at 994.
89. Id.
90. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assoc., 918 F.2d 349, 355 (2d Cir. 1990).
[Vol. 51
COMMENTS
These difficulties can be avoided by simply adopting a uniform federal
statute of limitations for 1Ob-5.
Another undesirable effect of the application of state statutes of
limitations to lOb-5 is the lack of predictability which it breeds for
defendants who cannot determine their contingent liabilities during the
current state of uncertainty. 9' This will serve to increase the amount of
litigation, reduce judicial efficiency, and harm businesses and investors.
Finally, state statutes of limitations are inappropriate for lOb-5 claims
regardless of how closely analogous the substantive provision is to lOb-
5 because none of the state provisions are designed to serve the federal
policies which provided the impetus for the creation of lOb-5. 92 State
statutes of limitations are designed to serve and promote the policies
of that particular state. Federal statutes, however, are created with the
intention of serving federal policies, which are often contrary to the
policies favored by individual states. 93 For this reason, it makes no sense
to apply a state statute of limitations to a federal cause of action,
regardless of how closely analogous the substantive provisions are to
each other.
There are two significant arguments which militate in favor of
application of a state statute of limitations to lOb-5 claims. The first
argument is that the courts must show some deference to the forty years
of case law holding that state law should supply the statute of limitations
for lOb-5. Normally, it would be appropriate to defer to such a long
line of precedent in order to maintain predictability in the field. However,
in this case, adherence to the rule of application of state statutes of
limitations to lOb-5 would have the anomalous effect of reducing, rather
than promoting, predictability. The only way to instill predictability with
regard to the statute of limitations for lob-5 would be to adopt a
uniform federal statute of limitations.
Another argument in favor of the continued reliance on state law
to supply the statute of limitations for lOb-5 is that Congress has taken
no action to put an end to the use of state law even when it has
amended the Securities Acts for other purposes. Congress' inaction with
regard to the statute of limitations could be seen as tacit approval of
the practice of the courts.9
91. H. Bloomenthal, supra note 80, § 25.02(4), at 785.
92. Martin, supra note 20, at 454. "The fact that a state legislature may deem it
appropriate to provide a one year or ten year statute of limitations for an action 're-
sembling' an action implied under section 10(b) tells us nothing about whether the Federal
policy of that Section requires a short or long period of limitations."
93. Id.
94. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241, 90
S. Ct. 1583, 1587 (1970). However, this argument is weakened by the pronouncement by
the United States Supreme Court that "[ilt is at best treacherous to find in congressional
silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law."
1991]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
In light of the fact that nearly all of the federal policies tend to
favor the application of a uniform federal statute of limitations, courts
should not continue to apply state statutes merely because that is the
longstanding practice. In the words of Judge Sloviter, "[h]abit and
custom are not in themselves satisfactory bases for slavish adherence to
a former practice if there is no other basis for support. '95 Rationality
and practicality dictate that the longstanding custom should be aban-
doned in this instance in favor of a uniform federal statute of limitations.
Conclusion
The current state of the law with regard to the statute of limitations
for lOb-5 has been termed a "dismal failure."" It is clear that a uniform
federal statute of limitations would better effectuate the policies which
led to the creation of 1Ob-5. Presently we are caught in a period of
limbo. Several circuits have seen the Malley-Duff trilogy of Supreme
Court decisions as releasing them from earlier state borrowing precedents,
which had received virtually unanimous condemnation from commen-
tators in the field. These courts have adopted a uniform federal statute
of limitations for lOb-5, while the majority of federal circuits have been
unable or unwilling to put an end to the deleterious borrowing of state
periods of limitations. Until this issue is settled in favor of a uniform
federal period, forum shopping will continue and the congressional pol-
icies behind the enactment of uniform federal securities laws will remain
unfulfilled. 97 In DelCostello and Malley-Duff the Supreme Court sent a
signal that it favors the use of a uniform federal statute of limitations
for certain federal causes of action; however, for several circuits this
signal was not strong enough.9 The Supreme Court, in the absence of
legislative action, must expressly hold that resort should be made to
federal, rather than state law for the statute of limitations for lOb-5.
David Reisman
95. Roberts v. Magnetic Metal Co., 611 F.2d 450, 457 (3d Cir. 1979) (Sloviter, J.,
concurring).
96. Martin, supra note 20, at 457.
97. The question of which federal statute of limitations to apply pales in significance
to the question of whether to apply a uniform federal statute of limitations at all. See
supra note 55.
98. The signal was obviously not strong enough, as only three circuits appear to
have received it. Also, the test set out by the Supreme Court is not satisfactory for
application to lOb-5, as it actually requires a case by case determination of whether there
is a more closely analogous state statute or federal statute.
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